Dead Bodies -- Autopsies -- Authority to Use Parts Removed in Treatment of the Living by Shannonhouse, Royal G., III
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 33 | Number 4 Article 13
6-1-1955
Dead Bodies -- Autopsies -- Authority to Use Parts
Removed in Treatment of the Living
Royal G. Shannonhouse III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




agency, and made. a false statement under oath before that agency. His
effort was frustrated only by the fact that for some reason the agency
was either unauthorized to receive his testimony or by the fact that the
official administering the oath was unauthorized to administer it. The
defendant's acts, though not constituting perjury, nevertheless seem to
be within the scope of the rationale of the substantive crime.
To permit such actions to go unpunished because of "legal impossi-
bility" would not only condone planned and deliberate contempt of legal
proceedings, but would make criminality turn on rules which have no
functional relevance to the determination of whether the defendant's be-
havior should be punished. It would seem under such circumstances
that a court should be justified in punishing the defendant's actions as a
criminal attempt.
J. THOMAS MANN.
Dead Bodies-Autopsies--Authority to Use Parts Removed in
Treatment of the Living
Medical science has made great progress in the use of tissue, bone,
and other matter removed from deceased persons in the treatment of
living patients,1 but in North Carolina the sources of supply of such
matter are limited because of areas of uncertainty in the law with regard
to property and disposition rights in dead bodies.
2
North Carolina seems to be in accord with the general rule that a
dead body is not property, in the ordinary sense.3 However, a right of
testamentary disposition is recognized by the court,4 and provided for
by statute.5 In the absence of such disposition, there is a right to pos-
1 "It is becoming increasingly easy to use organs and tissues from deceased per-
sons (cadavers) in treating and sometimes curing, otherwise fatal diseases in living
patients. There is a good possibility that within 10 years it will be possible to
transplant complex organs from a cadaver to a living person." Letter from John
B. Graham, M.D., Department of Pathology, University of North Carolina School
of Medicine, to Richard A. Myren, Assistant Director, Institute of Government.
University of North Carolina, March 7, 1955. The Raleigh Times, March 28, 1955,
p. 9, col. 6, reported the successful transplantation of four ribs, a collarbone, and a
breastbone from the body of a deceased person to that of a living person. Colliers,
April 25, 1953, pp. 74-77.
. Although medical schools obtain cadavers for use in the study of anatomy under
the authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211, et seq. (1950), these sections do not
authorize the use of parts of such bodies in the treatment of patients.
' Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Welch, 82 F. 2d 799 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Gray v.
Southern Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937) ; Pierce v. Pro-
prietors, 10 R. I. 227 (1872) ; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905).
Accord, Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908). But see
Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934).
'Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., supra note 3. 25 C. J. S., Dead Bodies § 9 (1941).
r"... nothing in §§ 90-211 through 90-216, inclusive, shall prevent a person
from making testamentary disposition of his or her body after death." N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-213 (1950). N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1, et seq. (Supp. 1953) provides
for the testamentary donation of one's body to certain institutions for the rehabili-
tation of the maimed.
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session in the surviving spouse, if any, and then in the next of kin, for
purposes of preservation and burial. 6 Nowhere does the North Carolina
court intimate that the right of possession exists for any other purpose,
and no North Carolina statute specifically provides for sale, donation,
or other disposition of a dead body by the surviving spouse or next of
kin.
If there were legal authority to do so, parts removed during the
course of an authorized autopsy could be preserved and later used in the
treatment of patients.7 The right to perform an autopsy in North Caro-
lina is limited "to cases specially provided by statute ..... 8  The statutes
which so provide define certain conditions under which an autopsy may
be ordered under governmental authority without the consent of the per-
son entitled to possession of the body,0 and other circumstances under
which the consent of such person specifically is required. 10 None of
these statutes, however, authorizes the retention of parts removed or
their use in the treatment of patients.
In other jurisdictions, where authority to perform an autopsy is
given in general terms, without specific limitations, it has been held that
there is included by implication the right to remove such parts of the
body for any further microscopic examination as is necessary and proper
to accomplish the purpose of the autopsy. 1 However, in all cases ex-
amined, the attitude of the court was clearly opposed to the idea that a
general authorization to perform an autopsy might include the right to
retain parts removed for any purpose other than examination for a
reasonable time. 12 It is apparent from a study of these cases that those
'Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949); Gurganious v.
Simpson, 213 N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938); Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral
Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934) ; Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 147 N. C.
394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908) ; Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 299 (1952) ; 15 Am. JuR., Dead
Bodies § 9 (1938).
'After six days in storage, a six inch long piece of aorta was successfully trans-
planted to the body of a living person. Science News Letter, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 71,
col. 3.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) (This section also provides the right to
perform an autopsy "by direction or will of the deceased .. .and [in] cases where
the husband or wife or one of the next of kin or nearest known relative or other
person charged by law with the duty of burial, in the order named and as known,
shall authorize such examination or autopsy.").
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-7 (1953) (Officer prosecuting for the state in cases of
homicide) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-213 (1950) (Chairman of N. C. Board of Anat-
omy) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) (Coroner or majority of coroner's jury);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952) (Coroner, coroner's jury, or solicitor).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220 (1950) requires "the written consent of the de-
ceased person's husband or wife, or one of the next of kin, or nearest known rela-
tive or other person charged by law with the duty of burial, in the order named
and as known" before the administrative head of a public institution for the care of
the sick, insane, etc. may authorize a post mortem examination upon the body of a
person dying while an inmate of such institution.
"' Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Cal. 1933);
Winkler v. Hawkes, 126 Iowa 474, 102 N. W. 418 (1905).
12 Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358, 359 (S. D. Cal. 1933),
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performing an autopsy, even when properly authorized, are under a
clear duty to replace in the body before burial all parts removed, 13 and
that the next of kin of the deceased have a cause of action against such
persons for any violation of this duty.' 4  North Carolina has imposed
liability upon those performing an autopsy at the order of a coroner
when the order is later found to have been improperly issued,15 and it
seems clear that liability would also accrue in such a case for retention
of parts removed.
It remains to be considered whether consent to the performance of
an autopsy may lawfully include permission to retain and use removed
parts in the treatment of patients. If a dead body is not property, and
the property right, or quasi property right, in the surviving spouse or
next of kin is solely for the purpose of preservation and burial, it would
seem to follow that the person entitled to possession of the body has no
power to grant such permission. Since consent to have an autopsy per-
formed is based upon statutory provision in North Carolina,' 6 and since
that statutory provision is for consent only to the performance of an
autopsy, it would seem that there is no basis for consent to retention and
later use of parts removed.'
7
"No right was possessed by the insurance company other than to make an autopsy.
This included acts and operations necessarily involved therein. It contemplated
removal of the internal organs, but did not contemplate their retention." Robertson
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 232 Iowa 743, 6 N. W. 2d 153 (1942) (The court deemed
the demand of the insurance company for an autopsy to be unreasonable because
it included the authority to retain parts of the body removed, whereas the policy
gave only a general right to have an autopsy performed.).
" It re Disinterment of Body of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 1032, 58 N. W. 2d 24,
28 (1953). A court order granting an application to have an autopsy performed
included authority to remove such "organs from the body . . . as may be required
to effectively perform such autopsy, provided, however, such organs or parts of
organs so removed, except only such portions thereof as inay be necessary to be
subjected to microscopic examination, shall be restored to their normal place in the
body prior to reburial." On appeal, the italicized portion was modified to read,
"except only shavings or such slivers of tissue as may be necessary to subject to
microscopic examination," and the order was approved.
1" Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Cal. 1933) ; Gould
v. State, 181 Misc. 884, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1944) semble; Koerber v.
Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905). But cf. Gray v. Southern Pacific Co.,
21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937).
11 Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952) (It
is the duty of the coroner to have a post-mortem examination performed "upon
the request of ... any member of the family of the deceased. .. ").
17 The effect of consent to the use of parts removed for purposes of treatment
of patients apparently has not been decided in this jurisdiction. The question raises
a number of problems beyond the scope of this note. For example, would such
consent be an absolute defense to a suit for mutilation of the body if the court held
that the person giving the consent was not authorized to do so? Even if consent
were a good defense in such a case, would the agency retaining the parts removed
be protected by the consent of only the person entitled to possession, or would it be
necessary for complete protection to get the written consent of all of the next of
kin entitled to sue for mutilation of the body? The difficulty of determining with
certainty the identity of such person or persons is. apparent, e.g., where the deceased
was living apart from his wife at the time of his death and the next of kin lived
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A desirable solution of the problem might be obtained by means of
several slight statutory modifications, viz.:
(1) The statutes providing for testamentary disposition of one's
body to certain institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed 18 could
be reworded so as to give a present right of disposition for similar pur-
poses to the surviving spouse or next of kin, in the absence of such testa-
mentary disposition.
(2) The statutes providing for the distribution of cadavers to medi-
cal schools' 9 could be modified so as to include a specific grant of such
bodies to medical schools for the additional purpose of obtaining material
to be used in the treatment of the living.
(3) The autopsy statutes20 could be reworded to authorize the de-
livery to public institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed of all
parts and other material removed, upon completion of the examination,
with the written consent of the person entitled to possession of the body,
if known.
It is submitted that the enactment of such amendments would serve
not only to enhance the development of medical science in the field of
transplantation in North Carolina, but would also serve to clarify in some
measure the uncertainty in the law of this state with regard to the rights
of others in the bodies of deceased persons.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE, III.
Criminal Law-Insanity as a Defense-New Test for Determining
In the important case of Durham v. United States defendant had
been discharged from the United States Navy in 1945 at the age of
seventeen, after a psychiatric examination showed that he was mentally
unfit for Naval service because of a personality disorder.' During the
succeeding eight years he attempted suicide, was convicted of stealing
cars and passing bad checks, and was committed three different times to
mental hospitals. Two months after his third release from a mental
hospital, he was caught breaking into a house. Again he was committed
to a mental hospital. Finally, in February of 1953, he was brought to
trial in the United States District Court in the District of Columbia
in other sections of the country. From whom would the performing agency obtain
the consent where the deceased was survived by several children by two marriages
when neither wife survived him? Since consent to retention is, in effect, a dona-
tion, the statutes providing for consent to the performance of an autopsy do not
provide the answers to these questions.
"- N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211 et seq. (1950).
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-7 (1953) ; N. C, GEN. STAT. §§ 90-217 et seq. (1950);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-216.1 (Supp.
1953).
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
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